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Perhaps there are two main factors which complicate the reception of 
analytic philosophy of religion and analytic theology in the German 
speaking academic world: the lack of translations of key texts and a certain 
separation between recent work in analytic philosophy of religion and 
conventional theological discussions. With the present volume, the 
editors intend to bring together the diff erent perspectives with regard to 
an important doctrine of Christian faith, the expectation of eternal life 
and the resurrection of the dead. Th e book gathers thirteen essays many 
of which have been previously published (mostly in English), “striving 
with existential seriousness for a reasonable understanding of our hope 
for resurrection”. 
It starts with three well known theological treatises that have already 
received great interest during the last decades and are still to be regarded 
as reference texts in the fi eld of eschatology. More than half a century 
ago, Oscar Cullmann argued for a radical distinction between the biblical 
concept of resurrection and the Greek doctrine of the immortality of the 
soul (“Unsterblichkeit der Seele oder Auferstehung der Toten?”, 13-24). 
In Cullmann’s salvation-historical perspective, there is no intermediary 
state between the death of man at the end of his earthly life and his 
resurrection with body and soul at the end of time. As Gisbert Greshake 
correctly points out (“Das Verhältnis ‘Unsterblichkeit der Seele’ und 
‘Auferstehung des Leibes’ in problemgeschichtlicher Sicht”, 25-42), the 
enormous success of this critical comparison within Protestant theology 
in the twentieth century results from its close relationship to one of the 
central issues in Dialectical Th eology: While liberal Protestantism in the 
nineteenth century had limited eschatological expectations to the mere 
survival of the individual soul, for recent theologians the slogan 
“resurrection instead of immortality” is a consequence of the Lutheran 
doctrine of justifi cation, in which man as a sinner, impotent to save 
himself, is rescued from death only by the grace and power of God. 
261B O OK REVIEWS AND NOTICES
Greshake’s essay shows that many Catholic theologians have also been 
inspired by the challenges of Protestant thinkers to realize more clearly 
the problems associated with the traditional assumption of a bodiless 
soul surviving death and to abandon far-reaching philosophical 
speculation on eternal life in favor of purely theological arguments. 
Nevertheless, Greshake, like most Catholic scholars, tries to avoid the 
consequence that there may be a gap in human existence between death 
and resurrection. Th e solution he off ers is a “Resurrection in Death” 
theory, in which a disembodied intermediate state is replaced by an 
immediate transformation of man into a non-material bodily existence 
in the moment of death. Has the concept of “soul” therefore become 
superfl uous? Gerd Haeff ner reminds us that there are still valuable 
philosophical arguments to defend “something indestructible in man” 
that is required to guarantee personal identity even aft er death („Vom 
Unzerstörbaren im Menschen: Versuch einer philosophischen 
Annäherung an ein problematisch gewordenes Th eologumenon“, 43-
58). Haeff ner discusses the most important arguments from practical 
philosophy as well as from metaphysics and distinguishes his results 
from widespread misconceptions about the nature of soul. Th omas 
Schärtl classifi es the basic models for understanding resurrection in the 
current scholarly debates with particular reference to the problem of 
self-identity and persistence much discussed by recent analytic 
philosophers („Was heißt ‚Auferstehung des Leibes‘?“, 59-80). Since 
Schärtl himself is arguing for a model of the embodied person’s 
transformation in death, his paper can be regarded as philosophical 
support of Greshake’s arguments. Two positions equally criticized by 
Schärtl are developed in the following papers. Eleonore Stump, a major 
representative of analytical Th omism, defends the possibility of a bodiless 
survival of death and the expectation of the restitution of the body at 
resurrection day („Auferstehung, Wiederzusammensetzung und 
Rekonstitution: Th omas von Aquin über die Seele“, 81-100). Resurrection 
therefore is to be considered as reconstitution of metaphysical parts. In 
opposition to these considerations substance dualism is strongly rejected 
by Christian materialists that play a considerable part in today’s English 
speaking philosophy of religion, deeply infl uenced by the materialist 
monism of modern science and its consequences for the philosophy of 
mind. In Continental theology, Christian materialists are still rare, but in 
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the present volume their arguments have been taken into serious account. 
Peter van Inwagen reminds us that any Christian who refuses dualism 
for philosophical reasons, cannot only refer to the bible but also retains 
the ability to defend his hope for resurrection („Dualismus und 
Materialismus: Athen und Jerusalem?“, 101-116). Van Inwagen himself 
is the author of a much debated proposal that has been taken up by Dean 
Zimmerman („Die Kompatibilität von Materialismus und Überleben: 
Das Modell des ‚Fallenden Aufzugs‘“, 117-138). In the moment of 
biological death God may enable the survival of a human being replacing 
his body (or an essential part of it) by the corpse in a miracle that is 
empirically not verifi able. Man would be preserved in another world in 
a way that allows his resurrection on Judgment Day. In Zimmerman’s 
paper, Van Inwagen’s “Body Snatching” view has received some 
modifi cation still on the basis of its materialist premises. In connection 
with a physicalist theory of human persistence, in which spatiotemporal 
continuity of the body is a necessary condition, it may be conceivable 
that in the moment of death God enables the simples which compose the 
body to fi ssion into two nearest followers. Th e body of the dying person 
would be causally related without a gap in existence to the corpse 
remaining on earth as well as to a new “resurrection body” in heaven. 
Personal identity in this view depends on immanent-causal connections 
between all stages of bodily human existence, but not on the identity of 
material elements. To Alvin Platinga, Zimmerman’s suggestion sounds 
a little bit “fantastic” („Materialismus und christlicher Glaube“, 139-164). 
In his view, the problems Christian materialists have with explaining 
central doctrines of faith can serve as an important argument for 
accepting a dualist position. In philosophy of mind, “emergentism” has 
been presented as a middle way between (materialistic) monism and 
traditional dualism. According to William Hasker („Emergenter 
Dualismus und Auferstehung“, 165-187), its chief concern is to describe 
human mind, in conformity with natural science, as result of the brain. It 
“emerges” when the necessary material constituents are given under 
certain complex circumstances. But unlike materialistic materialism, 
emergentism does not claim to explain consciousness and other 
characteristics of the mind on the basis of material properties. Although 
this theory cannot off er any evidence for human survival aft er death, it 
affi  rms the logical possibility that God may miraculously sustain the fi eld 
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of consciousness even aft er the brain has been destroyed and that he may 
restore a material basis in the resurrection of the body. Similar to 
emergentism is the anthropological idea of constitution presented by 
Lynne Baker („Personen und die Metaphysik der Auferstehung“, 189-
208). Human persons are material objects, constituted by their bodies, 
but they are not identical with them, because the crucial feature of 
personhood is the fi rst-person-perspective. Th e persistence of a person 
therefore is guaranteed by the persistence of this perspective, and it is 
possible that the person survives a certain transformation of her body as 
long as the latter serves as a basis for identical self-consciousness. Because 
this condition can be fulfi lled by the power of God, Baker recognizes the 
possibility of resurrection without postulating an immaterial soul. 
A second essay by Peter van Inwagen combines a review of his earlier 
proposals for a materialistic understanding of resurrection with 
a thorough discussion of Baker’s Constitution View („‚Ich erwarte die 
Auferstehung der Toten und das Leben der kommenden Welt‘“, 209-
225). Van Inwagen is not convinced that God can provide a person aft er 
resurrection with a fi rst-person perspective numerically identical with 
the one that constitutes her as a person here and now without genuine 
physical continuity. Hud Hudson is another contemporary representative 
of “a materialist metaphysics of the human person” who nevertheless 
argues for the possibility of post-mortem existence („Vielfach und einfach 
verortete Auferstehung“, 227-241). Against animalism and the theories 
developed by Baker, van Inwagen and Zimmerman, Hudson takes as his 
starting point a perdurantist, four-dimensional perspective of human 
persistence. Th ings are not only constituted by spatial dimensions, but 
also by their extension in time. Between the existence in our earthly body 
and in our new material body aft er resurrection there may be a temporal 
gap that does not destroy identity. As an alternative to this assumption 
based on mereological arguments, Hudson off ers a second solution 
depending on his “hyperspace hypothesis” (explained in detail in the 
book “Th e Metaphysics of Hyperspace” published in 2005): Our four-
dimensional spacetime may be only one region in a greater continuum 
of physically independent spacetimes. With these premises, he can 
develop new models of persistence that diff er according to the number 
and nature of regions an object is related to. If human beings are material 
objects standing in local relation to more than one region with diff erent 
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temporal indices, or if they are located in only one region of space, 
that has two or more distinct temporal parts, resurrection could be 
possible. In the volume’s concluding piece, Godehard Brüntrup outlines 
a possible alternative way of recognizing persistence with avoidance of 
the problems arising from standard endurantist or perdurantist accounts 
(„3,5-Dimensionalismus und Überleben: ein prozess-ontologischer 
Ansatz“, 245-268). Departing from the principles of process ontology, he 
intends to bring together the aspects of continuity and transformation 
with regard to human beings in a more convincing theory named “3.5 
dimensionalism”. A subject has to be considered as diachronic a “series 
of momentary psycho-physical events”, in which there is no strict 
separation between physical and mental properties. Th ese events are not 
identical, but connected by immanent causation. Th erefore, persons are 
not “substances” in the classical sense of the word, but entities that consist 
of “slices” connected by “gen-identity” relations. But what can guarantee 
the unity of a person in this bundle-view, if its specifi c diff erence to all 
other kinds of beings consists in the fi rst-person perspective, the person’s 
stream of consciousness? Following on Whitehead, Brüntrup conceives 
enduring individual beings (“continuants”) on analogy with universals 
(abstract entities) in a conceptualist approach: Th ey never exist without 
a mind that recognizes relations and determines identity. Personal 
identity is the connection of diff erent events to a stable process under the 
presupposition that there is an abstractive mind to discover repeating 
patterns in causally connected events, thus defi ning the “substantial 
form” of continuants. In the moment of death the chain of events that 
constitute persons is interrupted. But God could make the person survive 
by creating a subsequent event that is connected to the last one in earthly 
life. His intervention guarantees the objective connection of all subject-
related stages before and aft er death and at the same time the possibility 
of “resurrection”.
With its careful selection of essays the volume off ers a comprehensive 
overview of the complex discussions concerning the persistence of 
human beings, their possible survival of death and the rationality of the 
belief in resurrection in the area of contemporary analytic philosophy. 
German readers familiar with traditional theological eschatology may be 
surprised about the relevance of Christian materialism in these discourses 
and about the fact that there are modern philosophers of religion 
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that do not much care about theological warnings of eschatological 
“physicalism”. It is less surprising that the historically well-known affi  nity 
between materialistic and idealistic monism is returning in current 
debates – the step from a psycho-physiological view of the mind as an 
emergent capacity of the brain to pan-psychism seems not to be too big. 
When boundaries between opposed theoretical attitudes become more 
permeable, strictly dualist positions lose some of their appeal, although 
they are still present. Unfortunately, in the limited context of a review it is 
not possible to enter into the discussion of the various theories outlined 
in the volume and to ask for the consequences that they imply (e.g. in 
regard to the concept of God or to other eschatological topics). Both 
philosophers and theologians who rise to these challenges, particularly 
in the context of academic courses, will use this book with great profi t
